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Abstract: We examine here two Ecuadorian towns and the state’s efforts to sup-
port their development through competitiveness initiatives. Neoliberal, economic 
globalization is often equated with the insecurities of market competition. However, 
economic policy makers do not foment competition as much as competitive advan-
tage. Whereas competition requires individual know-how, competitive advantage 
often involves cooperating to improve the underlying factors that help whole groups 
of fi rms. In Ecuador, policies have sought to engineer competitive advantage by 
creating industrial clusters. In our study, the town of Atuntaqui embraced the idea 
of clusters, uniting fi rms to work with international consultants and the Ministry of 
Industry. The economy has improved, but wealth shows signs of consolidation. The 
comparative case is a mechanized indigenous craft economy in Otavalo. Exploring 
how Otavalo’s development has generated a set of shared resources anchored in a 
market plaza, we argue that its economy is best understood as a cultural commons. 
The experiences of both places have shown that economic development must take 
explicit measures to defend such commons if the gains of strategic cooperation are 
to be sustained in the long run.
In 2001, a small group of clothing manufacturers launched the new 
trade show Expoferia in the Andean town of Atuntaqui. Elsewhere in 
Ecuador, manufacturers in all sectors were reeling from the 2000 dollar-
ization of the economy. This abandonment of the national currency and 
associated fi scal reforms were bankrupting hundreds of textile operators, 
furniture makers, and other small businesses. Producers in Atuntaqui, 
though, worked with renewed energy. Backed by national television ad-
vertising, their Expoferia drew an estimated twenty thousand attendees 
in its fi rst year and grew to attract one hundred thousand by 2006. Manu-
facturers went on a building spree, opening new showrooms along the 
town’s main avenues. Governments at both local and national levels got 
on board. Promoting Atuntaqui’s fashion along with the country’s more 
famous bananas and cut fl owers, Ecuador’s consulates issued press reports 
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on the town’s sales (Consulado General del Ecuador en Montreal 2003). 
Delegations from other provincial towns came calling on the local cham-
ber of commerce, trying to learn the secret of Atuntaqui’s turnaround.
What lies behind Atuntaqui’s success? When we asked the mayor of 
Atuntaqui during an interview in 2005, he responded, “Coming together 
in associations.” For his town or any town to get ahead, what Mayor Yepez 
wanted to know was, “How can we successively structure a cluster that 
brings together however many, one, two, three, ten, twenty-fi ve? The im-
portant thing is that we arrive with a better capacity, to create the capacity 
to build something, to initiate a change in mentality.”
In scholarly literature, the defi nition of a cluster is quite dry: “Firms 
engaged in traded and untraded relationships with each other, with sup-
pliers of specialized services and knowledge inputs and infrastructure 
and with governments and consumers” (Wolfe and Lucas 2005, 1). But in 
Atuntaqui, the cluster became a new rallying cry of solidarity. As Yepez 
explained to a trade group in a neighboring town: “For me the most fun-
damental thing . . . is to demonstrate this power of the people: associating 
with others is the only concept in the whole world.”
Meanwhile, in nearby Otavalo, one of the Andes’ success stories of 
competitive entrepreneurship was unraveling. Since the 1940s, Quichua-
speaking, native Otavaleño weavers and vendors had transformed a pro-
vincial marketplace into a center of commercial growth and cultural in-
novation. The anthropologist Lynn Meisch (2002) documented that, in 
the mid-1990s, nine air cargo companies operated in Otavalo, shipping 
more than 1,500 tons of merchandise annually. The most popular product, 
hand-knit sweaters, grossed more than $15 million a year. The dollariza-
tion, though, eliminated foreign-exchange advantages and exposed the 
market to cheap imports. Although a few trades have once again begun to 
expand, many producers have struggled. In 2005, artisan leaders signed 
on to the government-sponsored program Participatory Assessment of 
Competitive Advantage, hoping, in part, to use ideas applied in Atuntaqui 
to restore sales in Otavalo. These examples from the Ecuadorian Andes 
reveal a social dimension of neoliberal capitalism largely overlooked in 
much critical scholarship. Anthropological writings, for example, dwell 
on global-driven markets as amoral and ruthless. Thus, the Comaroffs 
(2000, 298) introduce their Millennial Capitalism as follows: Neoliberal capi-
talism “appears both to include and to marginalize in unanticipated ways; 
to produce desire and expectation on a global scale (Trouillot 1999) yet to 
decrease the certainty of work or security of persons; to magnify class dif-
ferences but to undercut class consciousness; above all to offer up vast, al-
most instantaneous riches to those who master its spectral technologies—
and simultaneously to threaten the very existence of those who do not.”
The Comaroffs develop their analysis to suggest that modern capital-
ism has become so capricious, so dislodged from social worlds of produc-
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tion, that it has become an occult force. The new spirit of capitalism is not 
Weber’s Protestant ethic but a dark, external agency that strikes at random 
for good or ill. Bourdieu, for his part, still saw something of an oppres-
sive rationality at work. He characterized neoliberalism as (1998, 35) “an 
unfettered capitalism without any disguise but rationalized, pushed to 
the limit of its economic effi cacy by the introduction of modern forms of 
domination, such as ‘business administration’ . . . market research and 
advertising.”
In provincial Latin America, however, the new realities of capitalism 
arrive neither in the dazzle of big payouts nor couched in the science of 
markets. Rather, the future of livelihoods is being addressed in work-
shops that teach competitors about unity and collaboration. To put a fi ner 
point on it, in an era of free trade, economists and ministers of indus-
try do not promote competition but competitive advantage (Porter 1998). 
Whereas competition requires individual know-how and hustle, competi-
tive advantage involves the underlying factors that enhance the position 
of whole groups of fi rms. This conceptual distinction has put in motion 
government-backed programs of cooperation and strategic alliances 
that can remake local economic communities (Drabenstott, Novack, and 
Weiler 2004; Wolfe and Lucas 2005). In Ecuador, Atuntaqui symbolizes 
the rewards for getting it right. Otavalo’s troubles, though, are a reminder 
of how the benefi ts of competitive entrepreneurship can dry up—at pre-
cisely that moment when promarket liberalism is meant to champion it. 
The recent histories of these towns raise a complex question: what keeps 
competitors from turning on one another and destroying the value they 
create through their interactions? More pointedly, is it possible for the cre-
ativity, skills, and resources that have been created through a group of 
producers’ efforts to remain anchored in such places as small Andean cit-
ies even as they are pressured by globalization?
Case studies of small-time industrial clusters in developing countries 
both demonstrate the power of grouping and underscore its unpredict-
ability. Garment makers in Lima, Peru, for example, grew strongly in the 
1980s and then stagnated in the 1990s (Visser 2000). In Brazil, a cluster 
of export-oriented shoe-making enterprises in the 1970s transformed to 
include a few big fi rms with international presence in the 1990s (Schmitz 
1995). African clusters in fi shing and related trades, on the other hand, 
rarely launch any enterprise to prominence (Mitullah 1999). Schmitz and 
Nadvi (1999) argue that these variations do not weaken the importance 
of clustering but rather highlight the potency of carefully conceived joint 
action. Yet if coordination among producers can solve raw material prob-
lems or skilled labor shortages and the like, such joint action still leaves 
unsolved how to realize the promise of a cluster: to stabilize and repro-
duce a “culture of productivity” through time (Porter 2000, 25).
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We argue that these examples from the Ecuadorian Andes offer an al-
ternative model of a plausible, place-based economy. Rather than an in-
dustrial cluster, the model is better considered a cultural commons. In 
contrast to a cluster’s vision of cooperation engineered for specifi c eco-
nomic goals, a commons perspective puts at its center both a shared, ex-
ploitable resource and the stewardship needed to regenerate it. We come 
to the idea of a commons amid the concept’s rebirth. Scholars now write 
about the digital commons, the scientifi c commons, and the health com-
mons, as well as natural commons (Lessig 2001; Nonini 2007). By bridging 
such different domains with a single idea, they draw attention to a core 
claim: that social groups survive, in part, because of the knowledge and 
resources handed down to them, which they must hold in trust for the 
next generation. In much of this work, writers pit the virtues of the com-
mons against the greed of the market. That is, they warn that different 
types of public domains are at risk of succumbing to corporate takeovers, 
that common use is being lost to private profi t, and that privatization 
pushes aside community management.
Our goal here is to bridge the apparent opposition of market and com-
mons. We describe how a regional market works as a commons in three 
crucial ways: fi rst, competitors (who in fact may not cooperate in sys-
tematic ways) combine imitation and innovation to cogenerate a shared 
economic value; second, commercial goods and places produced through 
competition can become culturally marked and defended as community 
patrimony; and, third, markets that have built distinctive products identi-
fi ed with a people and place can fail the way commons do: through over-
exploitation, free riders, and incursion by newcomers. Indeed, regulated 
by cultural conventions and voluntary associations, the success of an eco-
nomic commons is precarious at best. Now with government-orchestrated 
clusters, commons may face a new threat of enclosure.
Concerned to show this vulnerability, we acknowledge, though, that the 
contrasts between clusters and commons should not be overdrawn. If dif-
ferent, they are not opposed. Both concern how commercial rivalry consol-
idates into collectivities of self-generating cultural and economic develop-
ment. Both entail fi nding a balance between competing and cooperating; 
and both see connections between economic productivity and collective 
identities. A commons perspective, though, goes further. It acknowledges 
the value of economic resources that accrue at the community level and 
points out the political role that communities must play in their defense.
A note on the information presented here. The project on Otavalo tex-
tile trades began in 2001. In the wake of the fi scal reforms, we explored 
the connections between innovation and economic success. We surveyed 
 forty-one producers (twenty-one mechanized sweater operations and 
twenty skilled weavers of wall hangings) about their initial investments, 
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their exports since the reforms, their design practices, and their assess-
ment of the current market. Otavalo’s largest artisan union, the Unión 
de Artesanos Indígenas del Mercado Centenario de Otavalo (UNAIMCO) 
collaborated with the project, opened their meetings to us, and ultimately 
used our information in their programming. In 2005, we followed up by 
expanding to Atuntaqui. Investigating perspectives on each town’s com-
petitive advantages, we interviewed fi fty-one shirtmakers in Otavalo and 
sixty-eight shirtmakers in Atuntaqui. As in Otavalo, we worked with 
a key producer group in Atuntaqui, collaborating with the chamber of 
commerce in a study for a design center. We augment core 2001 and 2005 
surveys with additional interviews, observations, and conversations re-
corded during our combined eleven trips and seventeen months of fi eld-
work undertaken between 2001 and 2007.
In the fi rst part of the article, we describe how Atuntaqui’s apparel pro-
ducers moved from passive to active cooperation to avidly embrace a clus-
ter model. In the second part of the article, we examine Otavalo’s mecha-
nized, craft economy to develop the alternative idea of a market commons. 
In the fi nal section, we track recent developments in Atuntaqui, showing 
that a cultural commons model helps account for the patterns of private 
and civic investment in Atuntaqui.
FROM FACTORY TOWN TO TEXTILE CLUSTER, ATUNTAQUI, 1965–2005
In Atuntaqui, before there were clusters, there was the giant factory 
Fábrica Imbabura. Spanish investors set up the textile operation in the 
1920s, creating its own hydroelectric plant, shipping in hundreds of ma-
chines from England and the United States, and ultimately creating the 
fi rst modern, industrial workforce in the region. Indeed, the mayor’s very 
job came into existence in the 1930s when the province recognized the 
importance of the factory and granted Atuntaqui and fi ve neighboring 
parishes formal political jurisdiction as a township (cantón).
In the ensuing years, the township consolidated politically while the 
factory faltered economically. In the early 1960s, the plant still nominally 
employed nearly six hundred workers and the rhythm of the town’s day 
was marked by the factory’s whistle, an old air-raid warning siren that 
had been imported from Europe. Yet the plant was no longer profi table. 
In July 1965, workers who had long gone unpaid escalated a months-long 
strike and stormed the plant offi ce. Although the state intervened on the 
workers’ behalf, it could not establish new terms under which mass pro-
duction could continue. As employment collapsed, the internal capacities 
of the factory—most notably a pool of skilled labor—unbundled into a 
new external economy.
Atuntaqui already nurtured a small collection of home-based manufac-
turers alongside the main plant. Some enterprising retirees had invested 
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in manual knitting machines and churned out fabric for tejidos (weav-
ings), primarily shawls and ponchos. With a sudden surplus of labor in 
the 1960s, these tejido operations expanded and were joined by new ones. 
By the mid-1970s, about sixty shops were operating.
Their individual successes contributed to some shared benefi ts. Writers 
on business clusters emphasize such externalities, recovering Marshall’s 
insights into the value of industrial districts (Caniëls and Romijn 2004). At 
a minimum, an established commercial center amasses “a pool of special-
ized workers, easy access to suppliers of specialized inputs and services 
and the quick dissemination of new knowledge” (Schmitz and Nadvi 
1999, 1504). Some industrial groupings, however, go beyond the minimum. 
Schmitz and Nadvi (1999, 1504) offer the term collective effi ciency to bring 
together both the incidental and deliberate effects of clustering, defi ning it 
as “the competitive advantage derived from both external economies and 
joint action.” More succinctly, clustering entails passive and active gains: 
“those that fall into the producer’s lap and those that require joint efforts” 
(Schmitz and Nadvi 1999, 1505).
Until the 1990s, Atuntaqui producers mostly relied on those benefi ts 
that fell into their laps. Grouped businesses, for instance, attracted a sup-
plier of industrial sewing machinery (Mainco) and a provider of acrylic, 
cotton, and polyester fi ber (Dytex), which both opened Atuntaqui branches 
in the 1980s. Local workshops competed for seamstresses, thus creating a 
job market that lured young women from throughout the township. The 
growing output of goods also attracted indigenous resellers who began to 
retail sweaters to Colombians. And over time, with Atuntaqui’s next gen-
eration getting into the family business, the apparel economy diversifi ed 
away from tejidos and into T-shirts, sweatshirts, and other casual wear 
(see fi gure 1).
None of this interaction, though, inspired fashion innovation or cre-
ated a marketable reputation for Atuntaqui. In fact, road signs on the 
Pan-American Highway did not list Atuntaqui among northbound des-
tinations for travelers setting out from Quito. In the course of our design 
survey in 2005, young producers criticized sweater designs of the 1990s as 
unimaginative. “Folkloric,” said one woman, dismissing the very idea of 
fashionableness. Mayor Yepez said to us in 2005 that, back in 1999, a group 
of producers came to him claiming the market had stagnated. “If you do 
not help us, we will die,” he reported them saying.
Active cooperation began in earnest in 2001. The effort combined inter-
nal initiatives with external support of international donors and govern-
ment agencies. In table 1, we offer nine characteristics to distinguish two 
modes of cooperation at work in both Atuntaqui and Otavalo throughout 
the initiatives launched during the 2000s. The fi rst mode, stewardship, 
we link to the commons. It involves cultivating nonexclusive resources, 
access to which depends on belonging to place. The second mode, stra-
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tegic cooperation, relates to cluster development as it came to be pushed 
in Ecuador. Although it too focuses on shared resources, the payoffs to 
cooperation are far more divisible and internal—fi rms are able to capture 
them. The more Atuntaqui business leaders looked for support from the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, Industrialization, Fisheries and Competitive-
ness (MICIP) and its program Assistance to Small and Medium-Size En-
terprises through Support of Clusters, the more this second mode came 
to the fore.1
To begin with, at the mayor’s urging, about twenty fi rms worked 
with municipal authorities to create Expoferia. Unlike previous textile 
fairs, Expoferia would showcase designs, fi rms, and the town itself—the 
joint marketing of a shared enterprise (table 1, characteristic 6)—and not 
cheap sales. The team built the programming around fashion shows, mu-
sic, and Andean dancing, scheduling it all for carnival in February 2001, 
when Quiteños would leave the city on holiday. According to the account 
Mayor Yepez offered us in 2005, some proprietors, including the second-
generation producer Richard Calderón, who employed more than fi fty 
seamstresses, collaborated only minimally. Such skeptics saw little chance 
of attracting crowds to Atuntaqui for something as vague as fashion. In 
the event, they were wrong. More than twenty thousand visitors arrived 
in the fi rst year.
Next, fl ushed with the success of the fi rst Expoferia, the mayor urged 
the fair’s organizers to form a chamber of commerce. He wanted an in-
1. Quotation from the development funding application “Solicitud de cooperación técnica 
no reembolsable,” by the Atuntaqui Chamber of Commerce, May 2004 (our translation).
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stitution that would promote further collaborations specifi cally among 
Atuntaqui’s fi rms (table 1, characteristic 5). Providing the chamber with 
free offi ce space, Mayor Yepez recruited Calderón to be president.
Calderón and Yepez then took the private-public formula to the next 
level, garnering international donor support to retool apparel production. 
To try to achieve up-to-date, fashionable clothing, they worked out an 
agreement with MICIP, consultants from the UN Industrial Development 
Organization, and a local university to develop a quality improvement 
Table 1 Contrast between Commons-oriented Stewardship and Cluster-oriented 
Strategic Cooperation
Characteristics Stewardship Strategic cooperation
A. MARKET PRACTICES





Private and protected 
by law
2. Exclusivity of product 
 designs
Innovation enhances 
image of rivals’ 
goods
Innovations distinguish 
goods from rivals, 
decreases value of others
3. Value of civic space for 
 private enterprise
Primary asset Neutral, sales and 
marketing independent 
of fi rm home base
B. JOINT ACTION, IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS, PRODUCER COOPERATION





by fi nancial resources
The greater the 
investment of private 
resources, the greater 
the share of payoff
5. Community identity as 
 condition of participation




6. Resource-specifi c 
 initiatives
Signifi cant 
investments in place, 
joint marketing of 
product class
Few initiatives aimed at 
overall market
7. Firm-specifi c initiatives Few initiatives that 
directly affect internal 
fi rm operations
Most initiatives aim to 
improve internal 
capacities
8. Regulation of economic 
 boundaries
Restrict access to key 
resources or customer 
base
Remove boundaries, 
meet external standards, 
open markets





peers and future 
participants
Fully divisible among 
specifi ed partners in 
cooperative venture
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program (Arcos 2006). With funding and technicians in place, they set out 
to radically enhance the manufacturing techniques of fi fteen local busi-
nesses (table 1, characteristic 7).
Over the following two years, these business owners hosted weekly 
shop-fl oor visits. Consultants pushed the purchase of large cutting tables 
for laying out fabric, the use of templates for patterns, and the arrange-
ment of sewing machines in effi cient lines. Owners were fl own to Chile 
and Italy to visit both apparel and tourism clusters. Arguing that business 
advantage lay not in secrecy but creativity, offi cials cajoled shop owners 
into allowing full access to their workshops for all other participants. This 
initiative proved so time consuming and intrusive that half the original 
fi rms dropped out. The results, though, were tangible. Some participating 
fi rms created new brands, others opened retail stores, and all hired on 
more workers. Success drew the original signatories back and resulted in 
a permanent, university-run offi ce of technical support.
Consultants brokered narrow strategic alliances to address specifi c 
manufacturing or marketing issues. For example, four of the largest fi rms 
worked collectively to negotiate a discount on German-supplied comput-
ers and software to automate aspects of designing, sizing, and cutting 
(table 1, characteristic 9). The price was still steep. Each fi rm had to pay 
$18,500. Yet when we interviewed each of the four fi rms in 2005, three of 
the four reported cost savings of 3 to 8 percent on material each month; all 
four reported being able to replace substantial labor time on cutting. The 
longest it took to pay off the equipment was eighteen months.
In 2005, the United Nations and MICIP organized tours to bring busi-
nesses from other Ecuadorian cities to Atuntaqui to learn how to develop 
by means of clusters. By the end of his tenure, Mayor Yepez chaired the 
northern Andean region’s council on competitiveness. Perhaps most im-
portant, in our 2005 survey of Atuntaqui apparel businesses, we found 
that the sixty-eight largest sporting apparel fi rms employed 985 workers—
more than the old factory did through the 1970s and 1980s. The textile tra-
dition had passed from a single industrial plant to a new constellation of 
branded fashion outlets.
Having successfully turned the economic corner, Atuntaqui’s recent 
growth nonetheless raises three concerns for both municipal authorities 
and some business owners. First, how far will standardizing production 
to international norms carry these businesses? In Atuntaqui in 2005, we 
found that the owner of the second-largest factory kept a computerized 
printout comparing his unit-per-worker output to levels achieved in Hon-
duras, Vietnam, and China. However, the closer the workers came to the 
levels, the clearer was their problem. If they have to compete internation-
ally on price, they will struggle to survive (Rivoli 2006). In September 2007, 
Atuntaqui proprietors circulated an article among themselves that indi-
cated Chinese monthly wages to be roughly half of Ecuadorian wages. 
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This news, in fact, came just after the Ecuadorian national textile associa-
tion invited Atuntaqui entrepreneurs on an exploratory trip to China to 
meet with fabric producers and owners of production facilities (Atuntaqui 
Chamber of Commerce, August 2007).
Second, having opened their doors and remade their brands, how do 
operations achieve the creativity they promise as Ecuador’s center of fash-
ion? In 2005, when we asked one midsize producer with thirty employ-
ees whether he would use the chamber’s proposed design facilities, he 
responded no. He reported that he had cut back his production to two 
styles of T-shirts and one sweatshirt so that he could keep his quanti-
ties up. Even the Expoferia paradoxically underplayed local designs. In 
2007, for example, the evening fashion shows eschewed local fi rms and 
used the main catwalk to promote the out-of-town fashion-model revues 
X-Fashion and P.P.Q.P. Organizers delivered the sizzle of fashion without 
the substance of local design.
Third, as the technical assistance has shifted to supporting strategic 
alliances, broad goals of community development risk shrinking into 
narrowly targeted payoffs that are monopolized by the wealthiest fi rms. 
The chamber of commerce’s own numbers underscore the problem. The 
chamber estimates that between 400 and 500 families produce cloth, 
clothing, or designs, yet only 140 textile fi rms have signed on as members 
of the chamber. Of these, between forty and seventy participate actively 
in Expoferia (sixty-six in 2007). Indeed, only fi fteen received the full, di-
rect benefi ts of the continuous quality improvement program. The four 
fi rms that emerged as owners of the computer design system in 2005 show 
how the public effort can ultimately cement a position of just a few enter-
prises. Further, these same fi rms have built on that collaboration to launch 
the new shared, high-quality brand Once in 2007. The new label signals 
Atuntaqui’s continued entrepreneurial strength. Yet if the brand catches 
on nationally or internationally, few customers will necessarily know the 
town behind the brand. And with Chinese producers wooing companies, 
outsourcing is not out of the question.
In summary, development by means of clusters has left open basic con-
cerns: how to achieve a distinctive identity for one’s goods so that cheap 
imports cannot simply replace them, how to create something new amid 
the pressure to standardize, and how a community can build a trade in 
such a way that the a few successful ventures do not ultimately internalize 
the benefi ts. Potential answers to these issues lie down the Pan-American 
Highway in Otavalo.
OTAVALO TEXTILES AND THE MAKING OF A MARKET COMMONS, 1960S–2000
Connected to international markets since the 1940s, Otavalo craft pro-
duction reached the peak of its modern expansion in the 1990s. Regional 
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weaving traditions, the end of indentured agricultural labor, the growth 
of tourism, and the ease of intercontinental travel all came together to jolt a 
provincial handwork tradition into high gear (Meisch 2002). If Atuntaqui’s 
textile economy has been shaped by the legacy of the factory, Otavalo’s has 
been stamped by an open-air market known to all as the Plaza de Ponchos.
Once a dusty square on the northern edge of town, the Plaza de Ponchos 
was home to a weekly market for both artisan goods and basic household 
necessities from early in the twentieth century.2 In 1973, municipal au-
thorities worked with a Dutch aid agency to pave the plaza and erect fl at, 
octagonal, concrete kiosks. In this austere new form, the plaza has served 
a double function, enabling retail trade to tourists and bulk trade among 
indigenous manufacturers and intermediaries. As tourists began to buy 
from Otavaleños, weavers diversifi ed away from ponchos. Accepting tute-
lage from Peace Corps volunteers in the 1960s, and partnering with hippie 
entrepreneurs in the 1970s, Otavalo’s artisans found ways to turn basic 
weavings into wall hangings and bags. Soon they became adept at mar-
keting hand-knitted woolen sweaters, another Peace Corps product, and 
began selling growing quantities to other Otavaleños who traveled to sell 
handicrafts in Europe.
Having made their town synonymous with indigenous handicrafts, en-
trepreneurs pushed the boundaries of that category. Working with acrylic 
and polyester raw material, producers started businesses in hammocks, 
tablecloths, and embroidered shirts. Mechanized sweater production 
grew dramatically. In little more than a decade, twenty-one families de-
veloped the combined capacity to produce more than 1 million sweaters 
a year (see fi gure 2). No profi table innovation could protect itself from the 
action in the plaza. Once rivals saw customers line up for an article, they 
rushed out their own version, turning one person’s creativity into a trend 
and then one more Otavaleño cliché.
Indigenous handicrafts had achieved a whole new cultural and eco-
nomic reality; the plaza had become an emblem of indigenous industry 
and cultural rebirth. Beyond selling and buying there, the plaza’s users 
began to take a deeper interest in its future. Indeed, in Otavalo, caring for 
the plaza became a way to defend a shared economic base—their “shared 
interests, which include lasting resources, produced things and ideational 
constructs” (Gudeman 2001, 7). The Otavaleños’ concern reveals the way 
a market can give rise to a commons focused not on forests or fi sheries or 
pastures, but on ideas.
Commons has become a fashionable term. In response to Hardin’s (1977) 
famous essay that condemned the possibility of rational individuals liv-
ing from shared resources, many scholars have documented numerous 
2. The textile industry and entrepreneurial culture of Otavalo is extensively documented 
(Buitrón 1947; Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999; Korovkin 1998; Meisch 1998; Salomon 1981).
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ways that communities, in fact, avoided tragedy and successfully man-
aged resource systems (Acheson 1989; Agrawal 2002; McCay and Acheson 
1987; Ostrom 1990). Conversely, with markets tapping ever more natural 
resources, scholarship has shown where commons do falter. Privatization, 
overcapitalized production, or ill-conceived state management plans have 
brought many common-pooled resources to the point of collapse; commu-
nity institutions have struggled to keep up (Acheson and Gardner 2004; 
Agrawal 2003; Dolsak and Ostrom 2003; McCay 2002).
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But those concerned with the fate of the commons now have even more 
to worry about. Nonini (2006) argues that along with natural resource com-
mons, social, cultural, and intellectual commons are also at risk. In this 
expanded view, a commons represents an assemblage that people hold 
in trust to use on behalf of themselves, for past and future generations to 
make biological, cultural, and social reproduction possible (Nonini 2006, 
164). All commons, Nonini argues, have come under threat of disposses-
sion. Writers on law, popular culture, and technology, for instance, have 
rallied to defend the digital commons. Excited by the generative possi-
bilities of electronic media, digitizing culture, and Internet connectivity, 
they have fought to keep trademark and copyright laws from privatizing 
a vibrant, shared cultural space (Lessig 2001; McLeod 2001).3
Much of this new scholarship on cultural commons, though, dodges 
key practical issues. Work on digital culture, for example, celebrates the 
creative power of sharing without explaining how people might actually 
make a living from their efforts. The work on shared cultural property 
rights, on the other hand, examines the ins and outs of owning culture 
without offering a clear idea of how new cultural artifacts emerge, evolve, 
and yet remain characteristic of a people. Nonini (2006, 167) points out 
that, unlike natural resources, cultural resources depend on intense and 
frequent human involvement for their regeneration. Otavalo offers a use-
ful view into how communities generate and regulate cultural resources 
that hold economic value. Specifi cally, the commons-like reality of this 
resource system lies in three key characteristics: (1) nonexclusivity of 
commercial innovation and identity, (2) community-mediated access to 
resources, and (3) community management of a shared resources. But per-
haps the best evidence for the commons is negative. Otavalo’s market has 
declined since the late 1990s and its failure has been “tragic” (as Hardin 
would have it) in two key ways: a number of local producers have acted 
as free riders, running down what others built up, and Peruvian produc-
ers have arrived, breaching the boundary that fostered an identity among 
people, trade, and place. We elaborate on these fi ve features below.
Coinnovation
Designing goods in Otavalo has always been nonexclusive, a sort of 
joint venture that results from an unending sequence of mutual robbery. 
As one acrylic sweater producer reported in 2001, “Everyone copies. We 
3. The defense of shared stockpiles of ideas, though, can apparently pit one commons 
against another. Thus, as indigenous people have sought to defend their shared cultural 
heritage—spanning medicine, art, and places—from the trademarks and patents of private 
corporations they seem to be enclosing sections of the global cultural commons (Brown 
2003; Coombe 1998).
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are not egotistical. It is a free market.” At the time of this producer’s com-
ments, the showrooms of acrylic sweater makers started to display fi gures 
of eagles, war bonnets, and other motifs of Plains Indian culture—goods 
Otavaleño travelers were selling in North America. Within two to three 
years, these designs could be found in every venue that sold acrylic sweat-
ers. By 2006, shirtmakers had copied and miniaturized the same designs, 
embroidering them onto cotton shirts. Powwow regalia became part of the 
palette of indigenous Andean identity. Observing the same sort of copy-
ing and regularity of displayed designs in African art markets, Steiner 
argues for the importance of imitation. He writes that as artisans converge 
on a limited number of designs, they communicate via “the sobering force 
of repetition with relative clarity and precision” (Steiner 1999, 101). This 
seriality authenticates goods and affi rms the coherence of a market niche 
(table 1, characteristic 2).
As cultural conventions emerge amid a struggle for sales, competition 
becomes inclusive. That is, even as they compete to win business from 
rivals, producers enhance symbols, places, historical narratives, and com-
mercial reputations, which the wider community uses to attract custom-
ers and distinguish their goods (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2002). Painters and 
artisans from Tigua, Ecuador, for example, borrowed from one another’s 
art and sales techniques so consistently in the 1970s and 1980s that they 
created an art form that gallery owners came to describe as native Indian 
art. They settled on appropriate themes, honed the technique of using 
sheep-hide canvasses, and defi ned the settings in which Tigua art could 
be found. In short, they created a rich symbolic world that attracted sales. 
Otavaleños have done the same. In a given transaction, one vendor may 
walk away with the profi ts, but part of the value of the exchange stays 
in Otavalo’s plaza for others: the commodity design will carry over into 
versions brought out by rivals; the fame of this market as both native and 
novel will continue and draw future visitors. All of this is what one would 
expect of a weekly market of unknown artisans and traditional crafts. In 
Otavalo, though, artisans may own tens of thousands of dollars worth of 
machinery, have created their own brand, and have long-standing deals 
with chain stores in Europe. Yet for all the private investment, the value 
of one’s business remains inseparable from one’s predecessors, one’s com-
petitors, and one’s place of origin (table 1, characteristic 1).
Community Access
To get a piece of this value, one need not be a native Otavaleño—merely 
persistent, patient, and faithful to the weekly market. To be sure, the great 
majority of market stalls in the plaza and surrounding streets have been 
controlled by and traded among Otavaleños for generations. Yet  mestizos 
from Otavalo, indigenous people from other provinces, and in recent 
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years, refugees from Colombia have become regular market participants. 
Money and connections can help secure access to more valued spaces. 
Yet hard work has carried some far. A number of indigenous Tiguan 
painters—artisans with little capital—have become a permanent feature 
of the market by dint of their regular participation since 1992. Access, of 
course, does not mean success. Indeed, the real money is usually made 
through bulk wholesale deals, many of which pass through stores in the 
neighborhood around the plaza rather than the plaza itself. Yet access to 
a market stall may be the most valuable, or the only, economic asset some 
in Otavalo have (table 1, characteristic 3).
Community Management
Long aware of the value of the power of their market, Otavaleños have 
sought to manage it. By 1988, they had founded the UNAIMCO. The group 
fi rst busied itself with resolving disputes over market-space allocation. It 
offered documentation for the inheritance of a market stall or the sale of 
rights of use from one artisan to another so that the city would recognize 
the new owners and, by extension, the customary system of space alloca-
tion. More mundanely, UNAIMCO organized the cleanup of the plaza, the 
placement of trash cans, and the provision of shared phone service.
Since 1996, though, the artisan union has invested more of its money 
and effort in cultural management than in economic programs. Members 
organized the activities of the annual Fiesta of San Juan, or Inti Raymi (the 
Festival of the Sun), which marks both summer solstice and the comple-
tion of the maize harvest. Traditionally, groups of men celebrated in the 
countryside by dressing in costumes and going from house to house in 
the dark, to play music and dance until receiving food and drink. Rein-
venting the fi esta, UNAIMCO raised funds to cook cauldrons of soup and 
sent out invitations to rural councils. In response, they received hundreds 
of dancers at a stage in the Plaza de Ponchos. Thus, UNAIMCO succeeded 
in stamping the market with a festive indigenousness, upholding a cul-
tural boundary of a group of trades. Unfortunately, its authority in recent 
years has stopped short of being able to sanction destructive competition 
within this boundary.
Free Riders
The shared value created by Otavalo’s busy artisans has never seemed 
more obvious than when they have jeopardized it. The Plaza de Ponchos 
has begun to fail Otavaleños in recent years, and artisans experience that 
decline as the collapse of a resource system. More tellingly, they point to 
their own misdeeds as a source of the problem—despite the obvious harm 
caused by external factors, including the dollarization of the economy. 
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Indeed, in the fi rst year after the abandonment of the national currency 
and the adoption of the U.S. dollar, sales fell for everyone. The acrylic 
sweater makers, who had been in the fastest-growing business in Otavalo, 
were hit particularly hard, with most producers reporting severe under-
utilization of their machinery (see fi gure 3). Only one fi rm remained in 
an expansionary mode, with sales outstripping capacity. It attributed its 
success to having a family member in Spain who sent back particularly 
fashionable color choices. Interestingly, this same family had a very open 
ethos. Admitting freely that she copied from her rivals, the proprietor also 
hung all her latest designs and colors out across her showroom windows 
for any and all of her competitors to see. As fi gure 3 shows, though, such 
successes were rare.
At fi rst, UNAIMCO responded forcefully, coordinating a boycott of sup-
pliers to stabilize prices. Subsequent protests against the fi scal reforms, 
though, stalled. As both union leaders and many artisans themselves ac-
knowledged, the dollarization was not at the root cause of their problems. 
Rather, as one union leader put it, Otavaleños were “burning the mar-
ket” through “disloyal competition” among themselves. Disloyalty in fact 
covered two misdeeds: imitations sold at a lower price and poorly made 
goods that gave everyone a bad reputation. One acrylic sweater maker 
Figure 3 Machinery Underutilization in Wake of Dollarization in Top 11 Sweater-
 Manufacturing Operations, Wholesale Sales Recorded June–July, Otavalo, 2001
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reported in 2001: “To get new designs, it is not easy; you have to ‘puzzle 
it out.’ Recently, I developed three new designs. I wanted to send these 
directly abroad so that no one would copy me. But what happened? An in-
termediary picked them up [and brought them to another producer] and 
already within two weeks there were copies. These people had copied the 
fi gures exactly. And now because of the competition the price drops.”
The artisan was referring specifi cally to a fi gure called cara del indio that 
he had spent two months planning out on graph paper and several hun-
dred dollars to have programmed. It went on to become the most popu-
lar new design in the summer of 2001. And while his rivals brought out 
identical versions, he shut down his workshop and began selling off the 
$120,000 in knitting machines he had accumulated.
Poor quality compounds the ills of copying. Another acrylic sweater 
producer described a customer of his from New York who once balked 
at the price of a one-thousand-unit sweater order. “The client went and 
bought them in the plaza,” the manufacturer reported in 2001. The client 
later discovered that the sweaters were badly made: “the wool in the torso 
was [eighty] grams too light, the sleeves were twisted.” The producer said 
that the former client ended up throwing all his rival’s goods away. “In 
the plaza there are no guarantees,” the sweater maker observed. Where 
conscientious producers worked to sustain a reputation for quality, their 
underhanded competitors have reaped the gains. They arrive in the plaza 
with poorly made goods, sell them at a discount, pocket all the profi t, 
and saddle the marketplace with a reputation for shoddy crafts. The oft-
repeated phrase “burning the market” aptly captures the sense of a short, 
rapid capture of the energy of the market, leaving ashes for those who 
follow.
Failed Economies Boundaries
Researchers who have worked on natural resource commons have em-
phasized the importance of stable property rights—boundaries on the 
pooled resources—as a condition of effective management and steward-
ship (table 1, characteristic 8). As McCay and Acheson (1987, 11) have sug-
gested, a starting point for the protection of a common-pooled resource 
is this idea: “If we can keep others out, it makes sense for us to do some-
thing about our behavior.” Otavaleños have recently found it impossible 
to keep others out. In particular, craft resellers from Peru have changed 
the dynamic of the market. At fi rst, Peruvian goods arrived in town via 
Otavaleño intermediaries who returned from sales trips to Lima with 
 alpaca sweaters. Then Peruvian resellers began to travel to Otavalo to 
strike deals with local intermediaries, who found outlets for them both in 
the plaza and among the travelers who sold crafts abroad. After a border 
dispute between the two Andean countries was resolved in the late 1990s, 
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Peruvians themselves began to travel freely in Ecuador. Consequently, by 
2001, at least eighteen Peruvian-owned shops had opened in Otavalo on 
streets near the Plaza de Ponchos.
With the Peruvians now taking over the distribution of their products 
within a market built up by Otavaleños, the Ecuadorians tried to push 
back. In July 2001, more than 150 Otavaleño market vendors signed a peti-
tion requesting a tax investigation of the Peruvian stores, with the goal of 
shutting them down. The spokesman for the Otavaleños put the case as 
follows:
The worry is this. First, two or three years back, the Peruvians were arriving and 
locating themselves in different hotels. They were arriving and with the merchan-
dise that they were bringing, they always handed it over to the Ecuadorians, to 
the Otavaleños, better said, to those who worked in the market. So Peruvian crafts 
were sold by the Otavaleños to the thousands of compañeros who sell outside the 
city, for example in Quito, Ambato, Riobamba. We have even sent Peruvian crafts to 
other countries. Unfortunately, in this past year, they have opened many shops. . . . 
In the past, the Poncho Plaza was good. Now, the market does not even give us 
our daily bread. Now one earns a quarter of the bread that one gives to our chil-
dren. For this reason, we are concerned to shut the stores of the Peruvians.
For the UNAIMCO, the guardians of Otavalo’s Plaza de Ponchos, the  Pe-
ruvian problem has been intractable. In a meeting of the union’s board 
members in the days after they received the petition, the president re-
minded the other offi cers that Ecuador has signed the Andean Pact and 
several bilateral agreements specifi cally with Peru. “How can we throw 
anyone out?” he rhetorically asked.
In 2005, municipal authorities began to acknowledge the severity of 
the craft economy’s problems. In keeping with contemporary models of 
development, Otavalo’s leaders embraced the importance of competitive 
advantage as a solution. In the summer of 2005, offi cials recruited mem-
bers of UNAIMCO’s board of directors to work with a team of national 
consultants on the Participatory Appraisal of Competitive Advantage 
(PACA) project. The project promised “to identify viable actions to rein-
force the competitiveness of economic sectors and local businesses.” 4 Led 
by specially trained residents, people joined in workshops to assess the 
components of their competitive environment.
The four weeks of PACA meetings and workshops turned up few new 
insights, though. Having enumerated the strengths and weaknesses of 
their market, PACA participants arrived at suggestions that ran from the 
mundane (better signs along the Pan-American Highway) to the quaint 
(donkey tours of indigenous communities). Many artisans in Otavalo 
talked about the need for more training. Indeed, they specifi cally noted the 
4. From the PACA PowerPoint presentation, “Como estimular el desarrollo económico 
local/regional?” given in Otavalo, in June 2005.
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turnaround in Atuntaqui through its recent initiatives. After PACA (and 
with encouragement from our research team), UNAIMCO even went so 
far as to contact several of the same institutions that worked in  Atuntaqui 
to run a workshop on fashion cycles. Yet neither leaders nor members of 
the union wanted to set up the invasive workshop visits or the intensive 
strategic alliances to negotiate with suppliers.
Instead, Otavaleños sought a robust defense of the identity at the heart 
of the economy: the link among people, place, and crafted goods they in-
herited from their parents and that they hoped would provide for their 
children. Thus, to regulate their own-destructive behavior—the disloyal 
competition—members of the union argued for a municipal-backed 
Otavalo seal of quality. The mayor and the union had been talking about 
the possibility, and some used the PACA meetings to plead for a tangible 
label that producers could use to show their commitment to quality. So, 
too, having complained about the deteriorating condition of the plaza dur-
ing the PACA meetings, an architect with the union eventually developed 
plans by 2007 to use pre-Columbian inspirations to resurface the market, 
introduce statues, and build a stage. And the fi ght to exclude the  Peruvians 
has only grown more acute. In 2007, UNAIMCO joined other local organi-
zations and drew up a petition that began its demands as follows:
The present ordinance protects the culture and identity of the ancestral produc-
tive and folkloric activities of the Quichua People of the Township of Otavalo and 
all of its communities, whether artisanal or of other type.
In the formal and informal artisan fairs, specifi cally in the Plaza de Ponchos of 
the jurisdiction of the Township of Otavalo, one will vouch for the sale of original 
products made in Ecuador, preferably from this locality. One will not allow the 
sale of foreign products that have entered illegally without permission or duties 
or taxes required by law.
On October 22, 2007, about one thousand artisans from throughout the 
province marched in the streets of Otavalo to protest the Peruvians and to 
present the petition to municipal authorities.
If one were a pessimist, Otavalo’s struggling Plaza de Ponchos can be 
read as one more instance of the wearing down of the commons (Nonini 
2006). Once an epicenter of cosmopolitan culture and a dizzying indus-
try of craft production, the market risks becoming an outlet of imported 
goods and timeworn designs. The state’s policies have hurt. Liberalization 
of borders and hard-currency reforms compromised the conditions that 
helped the market grow. And while state agencies supported Atuntaqui 
producers with money, experts, and years of training, they offered but 
four weeks of training in Otavalo. Although they are fully aware of such 
inequities, Otavaleños also acknowledge their own hand in their decline, 
especially the problems of disloyal competition.
Yet there are grounds for optimism, too. Shirtmakers, for example, are 
still introducing new designs and gaining new customers. The artisan 
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union and others have been steadfast in their commitment to producing 
goods with identity, to reinvigorating the plaza, and to prioritizing the 
rights of local residents so they are able to earn their daily bread by sell-
ing those products in that plaza. To be sure, in Atuntaqui, the cluster ini-
tiative has offered a sound example of constructing relationships among 
rivals through strategic cooperation. However, Otavalo offers evidence of 
an alternative, long-term orientation to defend the viability of a shared 
economic home base.
The approaches of each group of producers—commons-oriented 
stewardship and cluster-oriented strategic cooperation—differ in gen-
eral terms by their emphasis on shared assets or the private capacities of 
fi rms. However, it would be a mistake to view these two orientations as 
opposed. In many important aspects they are, in fact, mutually dependent 
rather than exclusive. The greater the successes due to strategic coopera-
tion, the more likely is the growth of cultural conventions that distinguish 
producers, enhance goods, and enliven a place. The commons perspective 
recognizes both the necessity of these resources and that they accrue to 
the collectivity, not individual fi rms. Further, they are potentially just the 
set of assets that distinguish producers and their laborers so as to offer a 
more defendable niche in the global economy. Indeed, as Atuntaqui has 
built on its successes in recent years, its model seems less and less focused 
on strategic alliances. Rather, town offi cials and business owners seem to 
be building their own cultural commons.
ATUNTAQUI’S NEW “WE”
Since the late 1990s and in parallel to the programs sponsored by 
MICIP, families in Atuntaqui had been engaged in their own inclusive 
competition, transforming the city center through a surge of investments 
in individual showrooms (see fi gure 4). Previously, the town offered a 
few discount sales outlets. Most were small and dark, looking like con-
verted school supply shops. The new stores, in contrast, feature bright 
display windows and spacious interiors, making fashion a street-level 
experience.
Both the chamber of commerce and city hall have reinforced the value 
of these efforts. In 2006, for example, municipal authorities rebuilt a por-
tion of the main square so that it could be used as a staging area for 
fashion shows and cultural events. They have also commissioned plans 
to partly pedestrianize one of the two main commercial avenues. With 
wide sidewalks tiled in bright colors, illumination from decorative lamp-
posts, and other upgrades, the town itself will take on a shopping mall 
aesthetic.
The chamber of commerce for its part has relocated the Expoferia. It 
used to rent the high school on the edge of town and set it up as a conven-
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tion hall with booths for exhibitors. Beginning in 2006, it made the core 
twelve blocks of the city into the convention hall. Shutting the downtown 
area to vehicles and setting up a catwalk for fashion shows and dance acts 
in the central park, the chamber let all downtown businesses in on the 
tradeshow traffi c. Most interesting is that seven fi rms responded to the 
open Expoferia by closing their relatively new stores and opening new 
permanent locations in the fair district. The combined efforts of fi rms, 
trade association, and city government are remaking the town into a fash-
ion landscape, creating a civic asset to assist private ones.
City hall’s embrace of textile enterprise spills over to its work in tourism 
and culture. When Mayor Yepez’s staff began to develop economic pro-
grams, they also drew up plans to convert the abandoned factory build-
ings into a textile museum. The competitive advantage they sought for 
sweater makers would be matched by claims for a unique cultural history. 
Economic and cultural differences would draw life from each other. The 
director of culture and tourism explained in 2005: “When people think of 
Imbabura Province, of the history of the people, they think of Otavalo and 
Cotacachi and that the history is indigenous. But it is not like that here in 
Atuntaqui. We have our own history.”
The factory embodies it. As the monument consecrating a “we” distin-
guishable from the provinces’ more renowned indigenous districts, the fac-
tory adds the weight of history to recently opened T-shirt shops. The vice 
president of the chamber of commerce told us during a tour of the factory 
grounds in 2005, “People think we are only fi ve years with this business 
[i.e., since the advent of the modern Expoferia]. But it is not like that. From 
the time we are born, we are textileros (textile producers), from eighty 
years ago.” By burnishing the symbols of who they are, residents hope to 
perpetuate the value of what they make. Identity and culture, in fact, have 
been elevated to be the central node of Atuntaqui’s development under 
the new mayor Richard Calderón, the erstwhile president of the chamber 
of commerce, who was elected in 2005. In the strategic plan of develop-
Figure 4 Growth in the Opening of Showrooms in Atuntaqui, 1965–2005.
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ment published at the end of his fi rst year in offi ce, identity was singled 
out as the touchstone of the twelve other concerns of his administration 
(see fi gure 5).
COMPETITION, CLUSTERS, AND COMMONS
Ecuador’s community competitiveness initiatives were instructive mo-
ments in the history of bringing neoliberal capitalism to the people. Sad-
dled with the hardest currency in South America, Ecuador lost jobs to its 
neighbors, its citizens to emigration, and its political stability to popular 
unrest. In Atuntaqui, Otavalo and thirteen other municipalities, the state 
responded by training people in the paradigm of competitive advantage 
developed by a Harvard Business School economist.
Atuntaqui made far more of the message of competition and coopera-
tion than did other localities. In 2001, the cluster message was a relatively 
easy sell in the old factory town. Proprietors embraced collaboration in 
part because it built on familial and social ties that crosscut apparel op-
Figure 5 Schematic Representation of the Place of Identity in Atuntaqui’s Strategic 
Development.
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erations, city hall, and the chamber of commerce. Yet to their credit, they 
went further than ever before to support a program of shared improve-
ment. In four years of sustained effort, many shops modernized produc-
tion, lowered raw material costs, and developed fashionable brands. Yet 
for all the economic gains, business leaders and town offi cials worry about 
the future. They are especially concerned about cheaper Asian imports. In 
fact, the success of the cluster initiative itself has led to the emergence of a 
small set of fi rms with distinguishable brands that could now outsource 
to China. The more the cluster project has come to focus on narrow, stra-
tegic alliances among top fi rms, the less tied the benefi ts are to Atuntaqui 
and the public institutions that nurtured them.
Otavalo’s development has offered a useful contrast in the growth of 
a place-based economy: the cultural commons. The culture at stake in-
volves, in part, values that facilitate a respect for (loyal) competition and 
entrepreneurship. Culture also entails the stockpile of shared ideas—the 
inherited creative legacy of an indigenous people. Yet the cultural dimen-
sion of this Andean commons goes beyond both values and heritage to 
generative habits that inhere in ongoing economic practice—it is part and 
parcel of designing goods, presenting products, competing for business, 
and earning a livelihood. Thus, a cultural commons perspective reframes 
the mutual dependence recognized in cluster initiatives in a more intrin-
sic way. At heart, it pushes people to identify that core characteristic that 
sets their efforts and community apart: what is it that both gives meaning 
to lives and value to products?
In Otavalo, such a characteristic is tied up with native Andeanness. In 
Atuntaqui, town authorities and apparel entrepreneurs have arrived at 
their own sense of identity, of being a modern textilero. Public and private 
investments in each place substantiate these identities in retail landscapes, 
civic events, museums, fi estas, and other efforts that preserve a unique 
history. In this article, we speak of the ideas and identities reproduced in 
these ways as a cultural commons to underscore that they are resources 
that producers hold in trust from previous generations, that transcend 
individual fi rms, and that cannot be effectively privatized. We also use 
the term commons to call attention to the ways they need to be defended to 
foster continued growth.
Indeed, the idea of a cultural commons pushes development projects to 
take seriously the idea of economic stewardship. Among other measures, 
projects need to seek out those individuals, fi rms, or voluntary organiza-
tions that have acted as stewards. Having mentored new entrants into tra-
ditional trades, promoted civic identity, and preserved the diversity, even 
idiosyncrasies of local production, such stewards can offer to their work 
and products a distinctiveness that modernization efforts alone fail to. 
Second, a commons perspective would take seriously issues of comanage-
ment, a joint effort between community authority and the state. Crucially, 
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such comanagement would recognize constructive ways of defending 
cultural-economic boundaries. In such a scheme, outsiders could not in-
discriminately tap the economic value built up in place in the name of free 
trade. Offering a level of protection need not mean total exclusion. Rather, 
it may entail getting newcomers to contribute to the collective good that 
others have generated and that these outsiders in fact seek to live from. 
Finally, when offi cials can preserve meaningful boundaries, development 
efforts should support local authorities’ efforts to promote creative com-
petition among insiders and sanction destructive practices—to develop 
the tools such as Otavalo’s hoped-for seal of quality.
Although our article’s title implies the limits of competition-driven de-
velopment, we are not in fact anticompetition. In Atuntaqui, theories of 
competitive advantage have been applied in creative ways. The economic 
successes are real. In Otavalo, competition has long been culturally gen-
erative, creating meaning, differences, things, and places that are integral 
to Otavaleño identity. Yet competitive dynamics in both towns are not 
enough in themselves to overcome shortcomings specifi c to each econ-
omy. The experiences of both places have shown that successful economic 
development will entail cultivating the commons that underlie fi rms’ 
competitive positioning and strategic cooperation.
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